Month: March 2026

Hydrography has always been about one thing. Reducing uncertainty before uncertainty becomes expensive.

The Egyptians understood that. Long before sonar, they were already measuring water levels and restoring order after the Nile floods wiped out boundaries and infrastructure. Their tools were simple, but the principle was powerful. Measure carefully. Repeat consistently. Turn water from chaos into something you can manage.

That, in essence, is still hydrography.

[Video: Evolution of Hydrographic]

For centuries, the lead line was the main tool of the trade. A weighted rope lowered to the bottom. One depth point. One moment in time. If you were lucky, a little tallow on the lead would also bring up mud or sand, giving you a clue about bottom type. It worked. Sort of. But it was painfully slow, highly manual, and left enormous gaps between soundings. In other words, it gave you information directly under the vessel and a healthy amount of optimism everywhere else.

Then came the fathometer.

In the 1920s, echo sounding changed the game by allowing surveyors to measure depth acoustically while underway. This was a major step forward. No more dropping a line over the side every few minutes. Now we could collect a continuous depth profile along track. Productivity jumped. Confidence improved. But there was still a problem. A single-beam echo sounder only looks straight down. It tells you what is below the keel, not what is waiting a few meters off to port. Or starboard. Or directly in the gap between survey lines where nasty surprises like to hide.

That is why multibeam mattered so much.

Multibeam did not just improve hydrography. It changed the question. We stopped asking, “What is the depth under me?” and started asking, “What does the entire seabed look like across my swath?” That is a very different level of ambition. And it is the reason hydrography moved from sparse measurement to true seafloor mapping.

One of the important commercial milestones in that transition was the SeaBat 9001. It helped bring multibeam out of the realm of specialist systems and into practical survey operations. Compact. Commercial. Usable. It made it possible for more operators to move from isolated soundings to real swath bathymetry. That was a big deal. Once people saw proper coverage, going back to sparse data felt a bit like going from radar to binoculars and calling it progress.

Then came the systems I know personally.

I had the privilege of helping to lead the development of the SeaBat 8125 and, later, the 7125 as R&D Manager for RESON Inc. The SeaBat 8125 was based on Jens Steenstrup’s (co-founder of RESON) brilliant ideas, with Mark and Kirk as lead engineers. This was a major leap in shallow-water hydrography. It delivered extremely high resolution, using focused beamforming, and helped redefine what surveyors expected from multibeam performance in ports, harbors, and coastal approaches. It was not just about measuring depth better. It was about seeing the seabed with a level of clarity that changed operational standards.

The 7125 took that further. Dual-frequency capability. Greater flexibility. Better coverage. More productivity. Better data in more conditions. This is where multibeam matured from a clever sonar into a true survey system. When operators can reduce infill lines, maintain data quality, and get cleaner results faster, that is not a small engineering improvement. That is commercial and operational leverage.

And then we arrive at the SeaBat T20 & T50.

The T20 & T50 represent the next stage in the evolution. Frequency agility. Advanced beamforming and better sidelobe suppression, resulting in cleaner bathymetry.

Better integration with inertial navigation. Higher data density. Less time fighting artifacts in post-processing. In simple terms, it reflects where hydrography has been heading all along. Not just toward more data, but toward better data. Data you can trust. Data that shortens the path from acquisition to decision.

That is really the story here.

The evolution of hydrographic survey is not just a story of better sensors. It is the story of reducing ambiguity. From Egyptian measurement staffs to lead lines. From lead lines to fathometers. From fathometers to multibeam. From multibeam to agile, high-resolution systems like the SeaBat T50/T51.

I give the examples of SeaBat sonar family, as that is what I’m most familiar with. Similar MBES to T50/T51 would be Norbit Winghead or Kongsberg EM 2042, all excellent MBES systems

We no longer just sample the seabed. We model it. We interpret it. We operationalize it.

And that is a very good thing.

Because the ocean has always been unforgiving to people who confuse limited data with real understanding.

Call-To-Action

Please comment and provide insight so we all can learn from each other. Did you ever used any of the older SeaBat MBES systems?

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Originally published in the Strategic Pings ))) newsletter on LinkedIn on 2026-03-31. Subscribe there to get new editions first.

Naval mines present a uniquely disruptive threat.

Modern warships cost billions, and tankers carry valuable cargo. Global energy markets rely on predictable sea lanes. Yet a relatively cheap mine ($1500), deployed by a fishing boat or patrol craft, can disrupt strategy, spike insurance, halt traffic, and unsettle both military leaders and markets.

That is the genius of the mine. It does not need to sink a fleet. It only needs to create doubt.

And in a chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz, doubt is operationally contagious.

This is where geography stops being background and becomes a weapon. On paper, the Strait looks wide enough. In reality, commercial traffic is funneled into narrow traffic lanes, which means a small number of mines can create disproportionate disruption. This is not just a naval problem. It is a global trade problem with a sonar solution attached to it.

The Threat Profile Is Built for Asymmetry

The mine threat in a chokepoint is not one thing. That is where many simplified conversations go wrong.

You are not dealing with a single neat category of weapon. You are dealing with a layered threat set. Classic contact mines remain dangerous because they are cheap, simple, and psychologically effective. Bottom influence mines are more sophisticated and far more selective, using magnetic, acoustic, and pressure signatures to wait for the right target. Then you have rising mines, which turn the seabed into an ambush position and compress reaction time to almost nothing.

This matters because each mine type creates a different tactical problem. One threatens the hull. Another threatens confidence. The third threatens timelines.

And the environment helps the defender. Variable bathymetry, cluttered seafloor, internal wave activity, coastal traffic, and shallow-to-moderate littoral conditions create exactly the kind of messy operating picture that mine warfare loves. Mines do not need perfect hiding places. They only need enough ambiguity to slow you down.

That is the real weapon here. Delay.

A minefield in a chokepoint functions not only as an obstacle but as a negotiation tool backed by explosives.

The Solution Is Not Heroics. It Is a System

Mine countermeasures once relied heavily on courageous personnel performing hazardous tasks in dangerous environments. This approach deserves respect but not nostalgia.

The modern answer is layered, robotic, persistent, and frankly far less sentimental.

First, you need domain awareness before the mines go in. Persistent surveillance matters because clandestine minelaying often hides inside normal maritime traffic. Pattern-of-life analysis, long-endurance unmanned systems, and AI-assisted anomaly detection are no longer nice extras. They are the front line of prevention. If you can identify the craft, route, timing, and behavior associated with mine deployment, you are not just clearing mines. You are shutting the faucet before the floor floods.

Second, once the threat is in the water, you need a detect-to-engage chain that keeps sailors outside the live minefield. This is where unmanned surface and airborne systems earn their keep. Airborne laser systems can search the water column quickly for moored threats. Unmanned sweep systems can trigger influence mines by pretending to be the kind of ship the mine wants to kill. Expendable neutralizers can then prosecute confirmed targets without asking a diver to become the last part of the kill chain.

That is the strategic shift. Not just finding mines, but industrializing the process of dealing with them.

Because in real mine warfare, speed matters, but confidence matters more. One missed mine can reopen the crisis.

The AQS-20C Sonar System Deserves Its Own Conversation

If you are serious about modern minehunting, you cannot talk only about platforms. You have to talk about payloads. And specifically, you have to talk about the AN/AQS-20C.

This is not just another towfish. It is one of the more serious answers to the mine problem because it combines multiple sensing modes into one operational package. Towed by the Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle, the AQS-20C brings side-looking synthetic aperture sonar, forward-looking sonar, a gap-filler capability for the nadir zone, and an electro-optical laser imaging function for shallow and near-surface identification.

That matters for a simple reason. Mines are opportunists, and blind spots are invitations.

Traditional minehunting involves tradeoffs: range versus detail, imagery versus speed, coverage versus gaps beneath sensors. The AQS-20C addresses these by combining multiple detection and classification functions in a single pass. In mine warfare, this enhances survival, tempo, and clearance probability.

Combined with the CUSV, this system provides critical standoff capability. The vehicle operates in shallow littoral waters, tows substantial payloads, and maintains endurance. This shifts risk by advancing sensors and platforms while keeping sailors at a safer distance.

That is how it should be.

Mine warfare is among the least glamorous naval operations. Clearing shipping lanes slowly and methodically lacks heroism but is strategically critical. Without reopening sea lanes, discussions of sea control become hollow.

Final Ping

The mine threat is not impressive because it is advanced. It is impressive because it is efficient.

That is why the answer cannot be a single ship, a single sonar, or a single brilliant operator. It has to be a layered architecture of surveillance, unmanned systems, advanced sensing, deception, and precise neutralization. The side that wins mine warfare is usually the side that understands two things first: chokepoints amplify fear, and fear travels faster than any fleet.

Sea mines are cheap. Strategic paralysis is not.

And that is exactly why systems like the CUSV and the AQS-20C matter so much. They do not just find mines. They help restore freedom of movement, which in maritime terms is another way of saying they help restore leverage.

Because in the end, the mission is not to admire the threat.

It is to make it irrelevant.

Call-To-Action

Please share your comments and insights so we can all learn from one another.

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Originally published in the Strategic Pings ))) newsletter on LinkedIn on 2026-03-24. Subscribe there to get new editions first.

Oceanology International 2026 in London (10–12 March) saw a large wave of new sonar, autonomy, data, and sensor‑platform launches, rather than a single “master list,” but several key themes and headline products stand out.

Major new hardware and platforms

Teledyne Marine unveiled the SeaBat D100 (first of a new “D‑Series” deep‑water multibeam echosounder) plus SeaBat T51 Integrated Dual Head systems that combine two multibeam heads into one processor, increasing swath coverage and along‑track density while simplifying cabling and footprint.

GeoAcoustics launched a new low‑voltage boomer (GeoPulse LF 101) and a major expansion of its bathymetric sonar range, including a new sub‑bottom profiler and updated multibeam and side‑scan systems aimed at marine, offshore‑energy, and geotechnical survey workflows.

Cerulean Sonar introduced Omniscan 3D, a high‑resolution imaging sonar that adds full 3D point‑cloud rendering on a true spatial mesh, building on the existing Omniscan family.

RBR launched the Generation⁴ logger family (RBRsolo⁴, RBRduet⁴, RBRduraturo⁴) with multi‑rate sampling, fast downloads, and large memory, plus a new RBRcoda chl‑a sensor for real‑time chlorophyll‑a in deep ocean profiles.

AUVs, ROVs, and autonomy

Skarv Technologies launched the Corax 600 AUV system, marketed around simple operation and very fast on‑board processing to turn data into actionable insights in minutes.

EIVA introduced NaviSuite ROV Autonomy, a software package aimed at standardizing ROV inspection workflows and enabling higher‑level automation.

Teledyne also showcased a Gavia AUV with integrated SeaBat T20 multibeam and Compact Navigator, plus the Slocum Sentinel glider “Redwing” on its around‑the‑world mission.

New sensing and imaging products

OceanSight (formed by Xpv Water Partners) used Oi26 to present an expanded multi‑brand platform for subsea sensing and intelligence, including the recently acquired Sound Metrics high‑resolution imaging sonar assets; this is more of a strategic platform than a single product, but it bundles several underlying imaging capabilities.

SeaSignal introduced a next‑generation Digital Recording Hydrophone with ultra‑high‑fidelity audio, >24 hours battery life, scriptable operation, and Gigabit‑Ethernet offload so an 8‑hour 100 kHz / 32‑bit recording can be downloaded in 2–3 minutes.

Cloud, data, and connectivity

The Marine Technology Society (MTS) launched BlueConneX, an AI‑powered platform that maps and connects the ocean‑enterprise landscape, providing AI‑driven summaries, trends, and industry insights.

WSense debuted WCloud, a cloud‑based platform for wireless underwater monitoring and communications that can ingest and visualize dozens of sensors in real time, with analytics and generative‑AI‑driven KPIs.

Notable developments and themes

Best Stand goes to R3Vox, which had an amazing display

Multiple exhibitors pushed integrated dual‑head multibeam systems, AI‑enabled quality control, and automated workflows for survey and USV deployments, especially around GeoAcoustics, Teledyne, and Exail (which highlighted its Sams synthetic aperture & mapping sonars and related sub‑bottom profilers).

The “COAST” focus at Oi26 highlighted coastal resilience and real‑time monitoring platforms, with new products emphasizing real‑time data, predictive modelling, and integrated ocean‑data platforms for coastal protection and adaptive infrastructure.

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Originally published in the Strategic Pings ))) newsletter on LinkedIn on 2026-03-18. Subscribe there to get new editions first.

The underwater world is very good at making smart systems look stupid.

A sonar sees a clean contact. Crisp shadow. Nice shape. Looks important. Then the camera arrives and discovers a rock, a tire, or some innocent piece of seabed clutter with delusions of grandeur. Other times, video picks up something suspicious, but without sonar context, nobody knows where it sits, how far it extends, or how to find it again without wasting half the mission.

This highlights the core challenge.

In subsea operations, relying on a single sensor is insufficient—whether for mine countermeasures, critical infrastructure inspection, or autonomous systems operating with reduced supervision, bandwidth, and error tolerance.

Sonar and optical systems are complementary, not competing, technologies.

Sonar provides range and functions effectively in darkness, turbidity, sediment clouds, and poor visibility, where cameras offer limited value. Cameras deliver confirmation by revealing texture, edges, corrosion, color, and structural details that transform a “contact” into a decision.

Separately, each is useful.

Together, they become operationally decisive.

Many still overlook this: the underwater challenge is no longer detection—modern sonar excels at that. The true challenge is identifying the contact’s nature, significance, and appropriate response. Detection is inexpensive; understanding is costly.

Data fusion is how you lower that cost.

High-resolution sonar, especially SAS, gives autonomous platforms the ability to detect, classify, and map targets at stand-off range with remarkable consistency. Forward-looking sonar adds the immediate awareness needed for obstacle avoidance and close navigation when visibility collapses. Multibeam provides the wider terrain context, the seabed geometry, and the route structure. Then optical sensors move in and do what they do best: confirm, inspect, and remove doubt.

That handoff from acoustic detection to visual verification is where the mission becomes faster, safer, and far more credible.

In mine countermeasures, sonar quickly surveys wide areas and identifies candidate contacts. However, the main effort begins when operators determine which contacts warrant further inspection. Fusing sonar with video reduces false positives, enhances re-acquisition, and accelerates classification, narrowing suspicious shapes to actual issues.

That is not just efficiency. That is an operational advantage.

The same applies to offshore energy and subsea infrastructure. Sonar detects changes in burial, free spans, seabed scouring, and structural exposure across large areas. Video confirms asset condition up close, including corrosion, marine growth, coating damage, weld integrity, and mechanical defects. Proper fusion of these data streams produces defensible asset intelligence, not just inspection footage.

Of course, none of this works by magic.

Fusion delivers value only when geometry is correct. Calibration, timing, and spatial alignment are critical. Misaligned sonar data and video frames lead to confidently incorrect results, which underwater can be costly and embarrassing.

Done right, though, fusion changes the entire logic of autonomy.

Now the vehicle is not just reacting to isolated sensor feeds. It is building layered understanding. It can detect with sonar, verify with video, correlate with bathymetry, update a 3D model, and support much better decisions in real time. That means fewer wasted dives, less operator overload, more reliable maps, and far better mission confidence.

The industry often assumes intelligence starts with software.

It does not.

Intelligence begins with perception. Good perception begins with sensor fusion. And underwater, the smartest move is to stop forcing sonar and cameras to operate like separate tribes with separate truths.

Sonar finds. Video proves. Fusion wins.

That is not a nice-to-have feature.

That is the future of subsea autonomy.

— Thomas Meurling Strategic Pings Global USV Strategy, Sensors and Seabed Warfare

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Originally published in the Strategic Pings ))) newsletter on LinkedIn on 2026-03-09. Subscribe there to get new editions first.

Everybody loves talking about the “shiny” parts of undersea warfare. The submarines. The sonars. The torpedoes. The AI. The autonomy.

But the most underappreciated technology in the whole kill chain is the humble decoy.

Because decoys are not accessories. They are the moment the fight becomes unfair. They turn “detection” into “doubt”. And in ASW, doubt is oxygen.

First, a reality check

A sonar contact is not a submarine. It is a hypothesis.

A torpedo warning is not a kill. It is a countdown.

Decoys exist to break the enemy’s confidence, timeline, and geometry. Not in theory. In the one place that matters: the operator’s screen and the weapon’s seeker head.

And here is the controversial bit.

If your ASW plan has no serious decoy and countermeasure story, you do not have an ASW plan. You have a hope-based concept of operations.

World War II: bubbles, ghosts, and operator psychology

The decoy story starts where so many undersea stories start: WWII.

German U-boats deployed Bold decoys, basically bubble generators. A canister produced hydrogen bubbles that created a false target for Allied ASDIC sonar. The intent was simple: make the escort chase the wrong echo long enough for the real boat to slip away.

They also used Sieglinde, a more “active” deception concept. Instead of just bubbles, this decoy could move and vary depth to imitate submarine-like behavior and sonar returns. In modern language, it was an early attempt at a programmable acoustic lie.

German U-boats used sensitive acoustic detection (passive sonar with beamforming) to track convoy ships by propeller noise. British engineers sought help from Scottish whaler Angus McCloud, who suggested using whale bones as underwater acoustic decoys. He claimed certain bones produced resonant harmonics when struck, a trick whalers used to imitate boats. The Royal Navy built metal frames holding whale bones with mechanical strikers. In blind tests, trained sonar operators reportedly mistook the sound for real propellers and cavitation. Produced from spring 1943, the decoys created phantom targets, drawing attacks away and reducing convoy losses.

The key lesson from WWII is not the chemistry or the mechanics. It is the human factor.

A decoy does not need to be perfect. It needs to be believable under stress.

ASW has always been a race between classification and doubt. The decoy’s job is to inject doubt faster than the hunter can classify.

Cold War: decoys become “platforms”

Fast forward to the Cold War, when sonar performance, processing, and torpedo seekers improved. Bubble tricks alone were not enough.

Enter systems like the Mobile Submarine Simulator (MOSS). This was not a noisemaker. It was closer to a small underwater vehicle designed to imitate the launching submarine’s signature, creating multiple credible “submarines” in the water. In other words: deception scaled up from a single false echo to a false tactical picture.

Read that again.

Decoys were quietly becoming unmanned underwater platforms decades before “UUV” became a PowerPoint word.

And the logic was ruthless:

• If the seeker is listening, give it something better to listen to.
• If the attacker is building a track, give them a more tempting track.
• If the kill chain needs confidence, poison the confidence.

Surface ship ASW and torpedo defense: the “Nixie era”

Decoys are not only for submarines.

Surface ships faced the same uncomfortable truth: torpedoes do not care about your flag, your pedigree, or your crew’s morale. They care about physics and signal processing.

That is where towed decoys like AN/SLQ-25 Nixie became iconic. A ship drags an acoustic source behind it to seduce incoming torpedoes away from the hull. It is simple in concept, brutally practical in execution, and widely fielded.

NOTE: I did a study about underwater decoys a long time ago. At the same time, we acquired a dog, a Weimaraner, who looked a bit like a small gray torpedo, so we called her Nixie.

This is the part people miss: towing a decoy is also about geometry. You are physically separating the “target” from the thing you cannot afford to lose.

And over time, towed decoys were no longer “just emitters”. They became part of integrated torpedo defense suites with detection, classification, tactics, and effectors.

Modern decoy technology: from gadgets to systems

Today’s threat torpedoes are faster, smarter, and harder to spoof. They can adapt, reacquire, and discriminate. The response has been to stop treating decoys as standalone items and start treating them as sensor-to-effector architectures.

Look at the UK’s Surface Ship Torpedo Defence (SSTD), known as Sea Sentor / Sonar 2170. It combines a towed sensor for torpedo detection with processing, tactical decision support, and both towed and expendable countermeasures. The point is not just to “throw noise”. The point is to recognize the threat and deploy the right lie at the right time.

And the development is accelerating. Ultra Maritime has recently discussed next-generation acoustic device countermeasures and ongoing modernization, which is a polite industry way of saying: “torpedoes got better, so our decoys must get nasty.”

On the submarine side, the same trend is visible. The U.S. Navy’s “next generation” countermeasure efforts with industry partners point to more capable acoustic devices intended to decoy torpedoes, not just distract them.

So what changed?

• Signal realism improved (frequency content, modulation, temporal behavior).
• Tactics became algorithmic (threat evaluation, recommended maneuvers, timing).
• Integration became the differentiator (the decoy is only as good as the detect-to-react loop).

The next step: decoys that are autonomous vehicles

Here is where it gets interesting for anyone working with autonomy.

The boundary between “decoy” and “USV/UUV” is dissolving.

A modern decoy already has:

• power
• processing
• an acoustic projector
• some level of programmability

Add propulsion, navigation, and a touch of onboard autonomy, and you have a disposable autonomous vehicle whose primary payload is deception.

Now imagine what that enables:

• A decoy that moves like the target, not just sounds like it.
• A decoy that adapts based on what it detects (active pings, weapon behavior, own-ship maneuvers).
• A decoy that creates multi-target confusion, not a single false contact.
• A decoy that cooperates with other assets, including other USVs and AUVs, as part of a distributed undersea defense screen.

This is not science fiction. It is simply applying autonomy to the oldest mission in undersea warfare: make the other guy wrong.

The uncomfortable conclusion

In undersea warfare, the side that sees first is dangerous. The side that makes the other side see wrong is lethal.

Decoys are not a bolt-on. They are a strategy. They buy time. They break tracks. They bend probability.

And as autonomy spreads across USVs, AUVs, and seabed infrastructure protection, the decoy stops being a “thing you deploy” and becomes a platform you operate.

The future decoy is not a noisemaker. It is an unmanned underwater actor in your tactical formation.

If you are designing an autonomous maritime system and decoys are not part of the architecture, you are building a race car without seatbelts.

Fast. Impressive. And one bad day away from becoming a very expensive reef.

Call-To-Action

Please comment and repost so we all can learn from each other.

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Originally published in the Strategic Pings ))) newsletter on LinkedIn on 2026-03-04. Subscribe there to get new editions first.